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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLITICS
AND THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
Graeme W. Austin*
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n 1992, a leading British commentator called for the development of a “much needed private international law of intellectual property.”1 Within the common law tradition, relatively little work had been done on the topic, but a few important contributions to the academic literature existed in Europe.2
Path-breaking work by many distinguished scholars3 has since
occurred, and there is now a growing body of case law on crossborder intellectual property issues. The current American Law
Institute project, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing
* J. Byron McCormick Professor of Law, Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. This article began as a speech delivered at the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium: Intellectual Property Online: The Challenge of MultiTerritorial Disputes. While this article cites other Preliminary Drafts of the
ALI Principles, the Symposium discussion focused on Preliminary Draft No. 3.
Thanks to Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss for her insightful comments on an
earlier draft and to Professor Richard Garnett for his advice on Australian
copyright law. Thanks also to Cinead Kubiak for her careful and insightful
editing. Responsibility for errors remains my own.
1. P. B. Carter, Decisions of the British Courts During 1990, 61 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 386, 402 (1991).
2. See, e.g., EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1978).
3. For a sample of these contributions, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private
International Law of Copyright, 273 RECEUIL DES COURS 253 (1998); Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An
Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 421 (2001); Timothy R. Hollbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Paul
Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69 (1998). On the specific
issue of copyright ownership, the topic of the present article, see Paul Edward
Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership
Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 351 (2004).
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Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational
Disputes Law (ALI Project),4 is another important stage in the
development of this body of doctrine and commentary.
In the last decade, we have seen the continued rise of an “intellectual property politics.”5 The politics of intellectual property has many facets. Some have described aspects of the domestic politics of intellectual property as a “war”6 characterized
by bitter disputes over the boundary between private rights and
the public interest. In the international context, we are also
witnessing fierce debates over the consequences of “imposing”
western intellectual property norms on developing countries.7
This debate is playing out in some developed nations as well,
where there is an energized concern whether national interests
are well served by a “one-size-fits-all” approach to international
intellectual property.8 In addition, set against dominant inter4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of
International Law) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; The Role of Equivalents and
Prosecution History in Defining the Scope of Patent Protection, International
Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (IAPIP) Resolution
Q175 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/resolutions/
Q175_E.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Deborah Halbert, Globalized Resistance to Intellectual Property (Feb. 3, 2005) (paper presented at New York University’s Engelberg Center Colloquium on Innovation Policy, on file with author); James Boyle, A
Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J.
87 (1997).
6. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337
(2002); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907,
908 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 5; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); Ruth
G. Okediji, Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States: Copyright
and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117,
155–56 (1999); Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property Development, 18 L. & POL’Y 315
(1996).
8. See e.g., Michael Geist, Copyright Reform is Not a Spectator Sport
(Nov. 2004) (discussing Canadian copyright law reforms), at http://www.
caut.ca/en/bulletin/issues/2004_nov/comm_copyrightreform.asp. The groundbreaking work currently underway by two New Zealand law professors, Geoff
McLay and Susy Frankel, both of Victoria University of Wellington School of
Law, provides another example. Professors McLay and Frankel are currently
engaged in an exhaustive empirical analysis of the domestic impact of New
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national trends is an emerging counter-discourse focused on the
checks that international human rights law might impose on
the seemingly inexorable rise of public international law obligations in the intellectual property context.9
This intellectual property politics forms part of the background context for initiatives such as the ALI Project. International conflict of laws might be viewed (unjustifiably) as a
somewhat arcane and abstract branch of the common law, aloof
from most political frays. However, in the present context, the
typical traditions of conflict of laws, theorizing and cool-headed
analysis, must now engage the highly politicized concerns of
contemporary intellectual property law and policy. Accordingly,
whatever the theoretical or logical unassailability of conflict of
laws principles distilled by the ALI Project, it might be helpful
if they were justifiable in ways that respond to relevant issues
arising in current debates about the future shape of intellectual
property law in domestic and international contexts.
In my remarks, I shall explore this point in the context of
rules for copyright ownership. This is only one part of the large
collection of issues addressed in the ALI Report10 and in other
commentary and doctrine on the interrelationship between intellectual property and private international law. It is also a
tiny part of intellectual property doctrine. Nevertheless, even
this narrow focus hints at some of the broader advantages of
engaging conflict of laws issues in ways that are informed by
intellectual property politics. Solutions to conflict of laws prob-

Zealand’s intellectual property law, focusing in particular on how well New
Zealand laws actually serve the needs of industry and the commercial sector.
See Geoff McLay & Susy Frankel, Survey of Intellectual Property Use in New
Zealand, at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/home/surveys/ip_survey.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2005).
9. See generally Lawrence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE
J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (discussing ways that international human rights law
might provide checks on the public international law of intellectual property);
Audrey R. Chapman, Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right:
th
Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c), U.N. ESCOR, 24 Sess., Agenda Item
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/12 (2000), available at http://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/447/83/pdf/G0044783.pdf?OpenElement (last
visited Apr. 16, 2005).
10. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.
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lems may be more likely to endure if they address the broad
concerns voiced in this body of scholarship and commentary.
Not all aspects of intellectual property politics will be relevant to rules about ownership in cross-border contexts. Yet, the
tension between efficient international protection of copyright
on the one hand, and respect for territorial sovereignty, or comity, on the other, is likely to be particularly important to current
and future debates. Efficiency-promoting ideas, which are often
distilled as transnational norms,11 are sometimes animated by a
concern that insistence on strict territoriality can thwart robust
enforcement and/or economic exploitation of intellectual property rights in cross-border contexts.12 Set against efficiency
claims are the principles of territoriality and comity. Territoriality and comity are common legal vehicles for expressing the
political concerns embedded in the notion of sovereignty.13 Territoriality taps into deep concerns about “what’s ours to regulate.” Transnational or private international rules are often
meant to override domestic policy choices and remove at least
some14 of the scope that territoriality allows for expression of
regulatory choices, but that does not stop people feeling resentful or angry about them. In a less emotionally freighted way,
these concerns emphasize the normative connection between

11. Transnational norms are not the only candidates for more efficient
management of intellectual property issues across international borders. See
generally Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998) (exploring methods for “privatizing” intellectual
property, including technological self-help and contract).
12. See, e.g., Adreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright
Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights
in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347
(1999).
13. See generally David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets
as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 287 (2004)
(discussing how the modern global marketplace challenges the effectiveness of
jurisdictional law).
14. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431
(2004) (exploring the scope provided by the TRIPS Agreement for domestic
self-determination in the development of research policies).
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domestic intellectual property laws and political accountability.15
Part II of my remarks discusses the tension and interrelationship between sovereignty and efficiency concerns in private
international law doctrine in light of two recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada: F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran16 and SOCAN v.
Canadian Association of Internet Providers.17 Part III turns to
the specific issue of choice of law for copyright ownership, and
examines contrasting approaches to this issue within the AngloAmerican tradition. The approach adopted by U.S. courts is
that the law with the closest relationship to the property and
the parties determines copyright ownership.18 This “single governing law” approach contrasts with that adopted by an Australian federal court, which held that questions of ownership run
with the law governing infringement.19 The latter approach has
the potential for multiple laws to govern ownership when a
copyright infringement action involves allegations of copyright
infringement in multiple jurisdictions. I suggest that a single
governing law approach to copyright ownership better accommodates both efficiency and sovereignty concerns than choice of
law approaches that seek to apply all the various laws of the
different nations in which a copyright work might be exploited
without authorization. Most importantly, a single governing
law approach can be justified as consistent with the concept of
retaining a strong connection between the intellectual property
laws that govern copyright ownership and the domestic policies
of the nations for which these laws have greatest relevance.
Part IV briefly concludes.

15. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and the Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992)
(noting the possibilities for resentment following the exportation of American
legal norms).
16. 542 U.S. 155, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).
17. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427.
18. See infra Part III for further discussion of U.S. judicial approaches to
choice of law.
19. This case is discussed further infra Part III.
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II. SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFICIENCY
Two decisions last June from the highest courts of the United
States and Canada illustrate some of the distinctions between
“sovereignty-based” and “efficiency-promoting” approaches to
international conflict of laws issues. The U.S. Supreme Court
decision, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, was a decision about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws
rather than intellectual property laws.20 However, the ringing
endorsement that the Court gave to “prescriptive comity” may
resonate in other contexts, including intellectual property. The
Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust law could not be applied when the adverse effects of alleged anticompetitive behavior in foreign territories was distinct and separate from adverse
domestic effects.21 The Court reasoned that extraterritorial application of U.S. law would impede different nations’ laws
“work[ing] together in harmony—a harmony particularly
needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”22
Given the rarity of antitrust cases in which domestic and foreign harms can be easily segregated, it is curious that the Empagran Court bothered to trumpet the territoriality of different
nations’ commercial laws. The Empagran decision might be
dismissed as merely an academic exercise with little practical
application. The Court’s vehement championing of sovereignty
interests may, however, hint at an emerging concern to confine
U.S. laws within their proper territorial scope. Consider the
following passage from Justice Breyer’s opinion:
Where foreign anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role
and where foreign injury is independent of domestic effects,
Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust laws, so
fundamental a component of our own economic system, would
20. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366. Empagran involved allegations of a
price-fixing conspiracy by vitamin sellers around the world, leading to higher
prices for purchasers of vitamins in the United States and in a number of
foreign territories. After the domestic purchasers settled, five foreign purchasers from the Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador and Panama continued their
antitrust claims. The Supreme Court held that while a purchaser in the
United States could bring a Sherman Act claim, the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) barred the respondents’ claims with respect to the higher prices paid for vitamins in the foreign markets.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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commend themselves to other nations as well. But, if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal
23
imperialism, through legislative fiat.

In line with these ideas, Justice Breyer distinguished earlier
Supreme Court decisions24 on the basis that they did not focus
explicitly on whether the claim sought to cure “only independently caused foreign harm.”25 The Empagran opinion suggests
that earlier cases did not clearly perceive important territorial
distinctions. The Court’s decision implies that we need to look
at modern cross-border commercial cases differently than in the
past. Concepts such as “global harm,” however resonant or
supportive of efficiency-promoting solutions to transnational
problems, may need to give way to analysis that focuses instead
on distinct, territorially-based injuries.
The Empagran Court’s deference to the legitimate interests of
foreign nations, and its determination to hold Congress to this
standard, contrasts markedly with the Court’s 1952 decision in
Steele v. Bulova Watch.26 In Bulova, the only modern Supreme
Court opinion on the territorial reach of U.S. intellectual property laws, the Court adopted an expansive approach to the legislative jurisdiction provided by the Lanham Act27 and held that
a district court was entitled to apply the Act to the defendant’s
conduct in Mexico.28 Congress has not, of course, entirely won
23. Id. at 2369.
24. Id. Justice Breyer distinguished Empagran from Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 595 (1951), United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1947), and United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 171–72 (1911).
25. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2370.
26. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952). The Supreme
Court did not mention Bulova in Empagran.
27. Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1122 (2002).
28. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided the mirror image of Bulova. In Group Gigante Sa De CV v. Dallo &
Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), which involved a claim of trademark
infringement by an established Mexican supermarket chain against a California-based chain that had adopted the same name, the Ninth Circuit established a “famous marks” exception to the territoriality principle, holding that
a foreign trademark owner may have superior rights in the United States,
where a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark. Id. at 1098.
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over the world in the marketplace of ideas about intellectual
property law; full substantive harmonization of intellectual
property laws has not occurred, notwithstanding concerted efforts toward that end.29 Empagran appears to counsel reticence
when considering choice of law approaches involving application
of U.S. intellectual property laws in ways that would override
foreign laws, lest those approaches also be characterized as legislative or judicial fiat. Unlike Empagran, findings of fact in
Bulova supported the conclusion that the defendants’ actions
adversely affected U.S. commerce.30 For present purposes, however, the interest in the case lies in the central issue in Bulova:
interpretation of an important commercial law statute that is
silent on its territorial reach31 to determine whether Congress
intended it to apply to conduct in a foreign nation. The Bulova
Court acknowledged that “the legislation of Congress will not
extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a
contrary legislative intent appears.”32 However, this came quite
late in the opinion, after the Court emphasized that Congress,
in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens, “may
project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States.”33
Particularly telling are the differences between the two
Courts’ approaches to sovereignty interests of foreign nations.
One of the key defenses mounted by Steele, the principal Bulova defendant, was that he had been first to secure registration
of the “Bulova” trademark in Mexico. However, by the date of
29. In this context, of course, “harmonization” is not necessarily a neutral
term. Depending on the context, “harmonization” may be a proxy for the
ratcheting up of intellectual property protections. Hence, some scholars refer
instead to “upward harmonization.” See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, ‘Global’ Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 443, 461 (1998).
30. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 284–86 (finding inter alia that “as result of the
distribution of spurious ‘Bulovas,’ Bulova Watch Company’s Texas sales representative received numerous complaints from retail jewelers in the Mexican
border area whose customers brought in for repair defective ‘Bulovas’ which
upon inspection often turned out not to be products of that company.”).
31. See, e.g., Anna R. Popov, Watering Down Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. to
Reach Commerce Overseas: Analyzing the Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial
Reach Under International Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 708 (2004).
32. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 282.
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the Supreme Court’s decision, Mexico’s highest court had upheld an administrative proceeding canceling the Mexican registration.34 According to the Supreme Court, this meant that
there was no conflict between Mexican and U.S. laws, and it
removed the basis for arguing that application of the Lanham
Act to conduct in Mexico would interfere with property rights
granted by a foreign sovereign: “Where, as here, there can be
no interference with the sovereignty of another nation, the District Court in exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction.”35 Rhetorically, and perhaps analytically as
well, the Court conflated the absence of defendant’s private
rights in the mark with the absence of any overarching concern
of the foreign sovereign with its ability to administer its own
trademark system.
Justice Breyer’s Empagran opinion seems to have more in
common with the dissenting Justices in Bulova than with the
Bulova majority.36 In his dissent, which Justice Douglas joined,
Justice Reed objected that the application of the Lanham Act to
acts done in Mexico “bring our legislation into conflict with the
laws and practices of other nations, fully capable of punishing
infractions of their own laws.”37 Absent “specific words,” the
dissenting opinion reasoned, federal legislation should not be
interpreted to “reach Acts done within the territorial limits of
other sovereignties.”38 Similar sentiments are echoed in Empagran’s insistence that statutes be construed in ways that allow
different nations’ commercial laws to work harmoniously together.39
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers,40 an important recent
copyright case, offers a further doctrinal contrast to Empagran’s
34. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks on the Line: The Story of Steele v.
Bulova, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW STORIES (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jane
Ginsburg eds., forthcoming 2005).
35. 344 U.S. at 289.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 292.
38. Id.
39. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366
(2004).
40. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427.
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insistence on constraining the extraterritorial reach of domestic
commercial laws. A key issue in this long-running Canadian
saga over who should be levied for music communicated via the
Internet was how to determine when a communication occurs
“in Canada.” The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Canadian Copyright Board’s conclusion41 that a communication occurs in Canada only if it originates from a server located within
Canada.42 The Court declined to hold that a communication to
the public occurs in Canada only if its recipient public is also
located in Canada. Instead, in line with international precedents,43 it held that Canadian courts could exercise jurisdiction
over communications to the public where there is a “real and
substantial connection” between the communication and Canada.44 Communication of copyright material could be, in the
words of the Court, “both here and there.”

41. SOCAN Statement of Royalties [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417.
42. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 451.
43. See, e.g., National Football League v. Prime Time 24 Joint Venture,
211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000) (U.S. federal court has jurisdiction over transmissions of copyright material to Canada); Los Angeles News Service v. Conus
Communications Co., 969 F. Supp. 579 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (U.S. copyright
breached when transmissions originating abroad are received in the United
States). The Supreme Court of Canada also cited recent changes to Australian copyright law, which provide that “to communicate” means “make available online or electronically transmit (whether over a path, or a combination
of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work or other subject matter” and that “to the public” means “to the public within or outside
Australia.” Copyright Act 1968 (Austl.) No. 63 of 1968, § 10(1), as amended by
the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, Sch. 1, §§ 6, 16. The
Court also cited Daniel J. Gervais, Transmissions of Music on the Internet: An
Analysis of the Copyright Laws of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, 34 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1363, 1376
(2001) (concluding that “[c]ourts will likely assert jurisdiction not only over
transmissions from France, but also transmissions into France that are alleged to cause damage.”).
44. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 455 (citing Libman v. The Queen [1985] 2
S.C.R. 178, 212–13 (per La Forest J)):
As I see it, all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant proportion of the activities
constituting that offence took place in Canada. As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a ‘real and substantial
link’ between an offence and this country ….
Id.
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Accordingly, jurisdiction under Canadian copyright laws
might extend to both communications received in and transmitted from Canada. The scope of jurisdiction, and potential liability, will depend on analysis of the facts of the individual case.
According to the Court, the connecting factors that may be relevant for determining whether the connection to Canada is legally sufficient may include: the situs of the content provider,
the host server, the intermediaries, and the end user.45 Localizing the communication tort at home, so that cross-border communications to the public that implicate domestic copyright
laws can occur both “here and there,” avoids—at least formalistically—the extraterritoriality problem. If, under domestic law,
communication to the public can include every step on the way
to transmitting the information to the public, the lex fori46 can
easily reach communications destined for a public population
located within a foreign jurisdiction as well as—or, indeed, instead of—a public located in the jurisdiction of the forum court.
In its analysis of this point, the Canadian Court acknowledged
the possibility of duplicative liability—liability imposed by both
the recipient and the transmitting state.47 Recall that in Empagran this was exactly the kind of problem that Justice Breyer
recognized, and sought to avoid, in the antitrust context.
Rather than engaging with this issue directly, however, Canada’s Court instead stated that the responsibility for solving
this problem lay with international lawmakers: “the answer
lies in the making of international or bilateral agreements, not
in national courts straining to find some jurisdictional infirmity
in either State.”48
An important doctrinal distinction between the two cases is
that the Canadian Court’s concern was with localizing transnational communications, whereas the U.S. Court was dealing
with choice of law issues once the legal wrong had been localized. As Professor Dinwoodie correctly points out in his contribution to this Symposium,49 however, localization of harms as
45. Id. at 430.
46. Lex fori is the law of the forum; the law of the jurisdiction where the
case is pending. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
47. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 462.
48. Id.
49. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 885 (2005) (transcript of
symposium presentation).
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domestic and adoption of the lex fori using choice of law techniques can have similar judicial results.50 At a general level,
determining whether foreign communications are “sufficiently
connected” to the forum may share significant commonalities
with an inquiry into whether foreign harms are “independent”
from domestic harms. According to Empagran, foreign laws
should be overridden only infrequently. In contrast, the Canadian Court seems to suggest that the risk of duplicative liability
is something we must live with, at least until a public international law solution is developed.
III. CHOICE OF LAW FOR COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
How might the tension between sovereignty and efficiency be
played out when developing choice of law rules for copyright
ownership? At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the
complexities in the notion of territoriality itself. The cases discussed in Part II hint at some of this complexity. Empagran
seems to trumpet sovereignty values through its insistence on
constraining the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust law.51 Yet, if we view the case in the wider context of intellectual property rights, the holding might have some important
extraterritorial effects. Viewed in light of the real politiks of
international intellectual property laws, the holding in Empagran may be tantamount to announcing: “you’ve got a lot of
American-styled intellectual property law, but we won’t use our
antitrust laws to rein it in.” Thus, the jurisdictional reticence of
the Empagran Court may affect (extraterritorially) the scope
and character of intellectual property rights in other jurisdictions. In contrast, the approach to localization of copyright infringement in SOCAN52—the Court’s apparent willingness to
apply domestic law to the transmission of musical works to foreign publics—seems quite “extraterritorial.” Equally, however,
jurisdictions whose substantive laws or approaches to enforcement allow for ready transmission of copyright works using
50. See Graeme W. Austin, Copyright Across (and Within) Domestic Borders, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
WORLD 105, 121–22 (Charles E. F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000).
51. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2363
(2004).
52. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427.
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digital networks themselves create extraterritorial effects.
Since transmission of copyright works cannot yet be efficiently
constrained at international borders, a nation’s laws may have
an extraterritorial effect if they result in transmission of works
to other nations where their receipt constitutes unlawful act(s).
De facto availability, even from foreign sources, has the potential to override domestic de jure prohibitions. Viewed in this
broader context, the approach in SOCAN can be seen, perhaps
more benignly, as facilitating the development of doctrinal responses to the extraterritorial effects of other nations’ laws.
Later in my remarks, I shall briefly explore ways of approaching the notion of territoriality in the context of copyright ownership issues. First, however, it may be helpful to briefly describe
the Anglo-American doctrine. Anglo-American cases have approached choice of law issues for copyright ownership in contrasting ways. The Second Circuit has held, in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier,53 that the law governing
ownership of copyright is the law of the state with the most significant relationship with the property and the parties.54 As the
Copyright Act55 does not contain a controlling provision,56 the
Second Circuit was self-consciously developing federal common
law to deal with this cross-border issue.57 The court also recognized that the law determining ownership could be different
from that governing infringement.58 The trend in U.S. in53. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1998).
54. Id. at 90. The Second Circuit derived this principle from the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971).
55. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–803 (2000)).
56. Nor does the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris revision, July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). See Jane C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private International Law of
Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 167–68 (1998) (“The [Berne Convention] does not supply a choice of law rule for determining copyright ownership,” but noting that there is an exception in the Berne Convention, Art.
14bis(2)(a): “Ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a
matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed.”).
57. See also Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270
F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 89.
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fringement cases, aside from the “predicate act” theory discussed below, is to apply the law of the place in which the acts
constituting infringement occurred.59 This is a familiar choice of
law technique: different laws can apply to different issues in
the litigation.60 On the facts of the case, the law governing copyright ownership was Russian: “the works at issue were created
by Russian nationals and first published in Russia.”61 However,
because the unauthorized reproduction occurred in New York,
the law governing the infringements was U.S. copyright law.62
Some fourteen years before the Itar-Tass decision, the Full
Federal Court of Australia, a court of broadly equivalent standing to a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, was seized of the same
issue. Rejecting the analysis of the trial judge,63 the Australian
Federal Court in Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd.64
held that Australian law governed all issues in a case involving
infringement in Australia of logos created in New Zealand, for
New Zealand clients, by a New Zealand graphic designer.65
Whereas New Zealand law would have vested copyright in the
plaintiffs, as commissioners of the design,66 Australian law contains no equivalent provision, leaving the plaintiffs without title
to the copyright upon which to base the infringement action.
The Australian Court’s analysis was fully reasoned on the own59. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.,
145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, No. 01 Civ.
7109(GEL), 2003 WL 1787123 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2003).
60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 cmt. d
(1969) (“The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all
the issues under the local law of a single state.”).
61. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90.
62. See also Silberman, 2003 WL 1787123, at *35.
63. Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd. (1984) ATPR 40-447.
64. Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd. (1984) 4 F.C.R. 450.
65. Id. at 458. See also SUSY FRANKEL & GEOFF MCLAY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 64–65 (2002).
66. The Copyright Act, 1994 (N.Z.). Section 21(3) provides as follows:
Where – (a) A person commissions, and pays or agrees to pay for, the
taking of a photograph or the making of a computer program, painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart, plan, engraving, model, sculpture,
film, or sound recording; and (b) The work is made in pursuance of
that commission, – that person is the first owner of any copyright in
the work.
Id.
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ership point. Indeed, unlike the Second Circuit’s Itar-Tass rule,
which is grounded in general conflict of laws principles relating
to property, the Australian Court grounded its analysis in the
Australian Copyright Act and accompanying regulations.67 In
particular, the Australian Court looked to those provisions that,
consistent with the Berne Convention,68 extend protection under
Australian law to foreign authors. The Court found the Australian Copyright Act’s extension of Australian copyright law to
protect foreign authors was of plenary application.69 Accordingly, it saw “no reason to exclude the Australian provisions
relating to ownership of copyright.”70
As the contributions by Professors Richard Garnett71 and
Graeme Dinwoodie72 to this Symposium explain, in a growing
number of contexts, statutory directives already localize intellectual property questions. The U.S. Copyright Act’s choice of
law rule governing copyright in restored works provides an example: ownership is determined by “the author or initial right
holder of the work as determined by the law of the source country of the work.”73 For the most part, however, courts are provided little direction on choice of law for copyright ownership.
In the context of registered rights, resolution of ownership issues is likely to involve at least some action by local registers.
The ALI Project proposes that the law to determine the initial
title of registered rights be the law of “each country of registration.”74 This approach means that sovereignty and efficiency
concerns coincide. Yet, a copyright’s existence does not depend
on the intervention of national or regional registers, but comes
into being with an author’s creative act. As a result, sovereignty and efficiency concerns are not so readily reconciled.

67. Enzed, 4 F.C.R. at 456–59.
68. Berne Convention, supra note 56.
69. Enzed, 4 F.C.R. at 458.
70. Id.
71. Richard L. Garnett, Trademarks and the Internet: Resolution of International IP Disputes by Unilateral Application of U.S. Laws, 30 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 925 (2005).
72. Dinwoodie, supra note 49.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (2005).
74. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 311(1).
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A. Efficiency and Sovereignty Concerns
Supporting Itar-Tass are some obvious appeals to efficiency.
Under Itar-Tass, only one law for copyright ownership need be
ascertained. That said, as international collaborations increase,
along with author mobility, it may become more difficult to apply the “closest relationship with the property and the parties”
test with predictive certainty. Unlike the Enzed Holdings approach, under which rules on ownership run with the lex protectionis (i.e., the law of the country for which protection is
claimed), it will not necessarily be possible to identify the applicable law with absolute certainty in advance. Itar-Tass makes
choice of law for ownership issues much more of a judicial, factbased inquiry.
This does not necessarily pose an insurmountable problem.
The current draft of the ALI Project puts forward an elaborate
list of principles to determine ownership in more complex
cases.75 These principles will assist decision-makers by covering
a greater range of factual scenarios where determining the law
with the closest connection with the property and the parties
might be difficult. We should also not think that a territorialist
approach, which creates the potential for different owners according to different laws, will always be simple to apply in practice. As Mireille van Eechoud points out, if a territorialist approach were multiplied across different jurisdictions, there
would be no single law to which chain of title could be traced.76
On the other hand, a single governing law approach may be
inconsistent with broader sovereignty concerns. Since intellectual property rights have been traditionally conceptualized as
territorial, identifying the law with the closest relationship to
the parties and the property seems to beg the question of what
“property” really means. By applying one law to the ownership
issue, the Itar-Tass choice of law rule renders inoperative domestic copyright ownership laws of the places where the work is
exploited.77 Moreover, even though foreign law applied to the
75. Id. § 313.
76. MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX PROTECTIONIS 178 (2004).
77. For tangible property, the law distinguishes physical items and the
legal rights, but there is usually only one “thing” whose ownership need be
determined. Even with other forms of intangible property, no national treat-
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issue of initial title in Itar-Tass, in many other cases it seems
quite likely, given global patterns of copyright consumption and
production, that U.S. law will apply. Add to this the fact that
U.S. courts have developed a choice of law theory for copyright
infringement—the so called “predicate act” theory78—that, in
some contexts, seems to be tantamount to extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright principles to infringing conduct occurring in foreign territories. The result appears quite similar to
the legal imperialism that the Empagran Court seemed so concerned to avoid.
Particular sensitivity about the impact of foreign laws on domestic property was recently manifest in an English case, in
which the trial judge declared: “the concept of a world wide
copyright is not acceptable as a matter of law.”79 The comment
was made in the context of a dispute involving different claims
of ownership to the works of Cuban composers (after their initial assignment), a dispute that eventually reached the English
Court of Appeal.80 Peer International Corp. v. Termidor Music
Publishers Ltd.81 involved competing claims to English copyrights in musical works composed by Cuban nationals. The
copyrights had been assigned under contracts entered into in
the 1930s and 1940s. A post-Revolutionary Cuban law purported to divest prior assignees of copyrights in Cuban music of
their rights for all countries for which the copyrights had been
assigned, unless the transfers had been approved by a Cuban
government agency. The English Court of Appeal was required
to determine whether the post-Revolutionary law or the earlier
assignments governed ownership of copyright with respect to

ment principle equivalent to that mandated by the Berne Convention for
copyrights gives rise to hundreds of different legal rights under foreign legal
systems. See Berne Convention, supra note 56.
78. The “predicate act” theory provides that a U.S. court may apply U.S.
law to provide monetary relief for copyright infringements that occur abroad,
where a defendant has, within the United States, made an infringing copy
that facilitated the foreign infringements. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); Los Angeles News Service v.
Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
79. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Termidor Music Publishers Ltd. [2002] Ch. 2675,
[2002] All E.R. (D) 143, at para. 71.
80. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Termidor Music Publishers Ltd. [2004] 2 W.L.R. 849.
81. Id.
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the exploitation of the compositions in England. Predictably,
the Court held that English law governed.
Peer International involved foreign expropriation of domestic
property, for which there are special rules.82 Nevertheless, the
English judges’ analysis suggests that their concerns over the
effect of foreign laws on domestic English copyrights went
deeper.83 The Court was concerned with principles at the heart
of the English legal system’s domain over property situated in
the United Kingdom. In support of the specific rule negativing
the effect of an attempt by a foreign sovereign to expropriate
U.K. copyrights, the U.K. Court of Appeal identified a number
of more general principles that precluded application of the Cuban law in the United Kingdom:84 (1) the prohibition against
extraterritoriality itself, (2) the “principle which favors the lex
situs generally,”85 and, most significantly, (3) the problem that
“if extraterritorial effect is given to foreign property legislation,
it can only be at the expense of English law affecting the same
subject matter.”86
Giving effect to foreign law affecting local property would
create tension with the principle that domestic statutes are “designed to fit in with each other.”87 The Peer International Court
82. DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 995 (13th ed. 2000). The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recognized this point
recently in Films by Jove, Inc. v. Beroy, 341 F. Supp. 2d. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2004),
where it declined to defer to a ministerial directive of the Russian government
that purported to change the ownership of a copyright license after judgment
had been rendered by a U.S. Court. The earlier opinion is reported at 154 F.
Supp. 2d. 156, motion for reconsideration denied, 250 F. Supp. 2d. 156
(E.D.N.Y.). The ALI Principles also address “Transfers by Operation of Law,”
and provide that for registered rights, the law of the country of registration
governs such transfers. For unregistered rights, the Principles propose that
such transfers are governed by the law of the country “for which protection is
claimed.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 316.
83. Accordingly, the fundamental principles on which the English Court of
Appeal drew for its analysis in Peer International suggest that the case cannot
simply be analogized to § 201(e) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which holds most
involuntary transfers of copyright to be ineffective. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2005).
84. The English Court relied on an important decision by Lord Devlin in
Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, [1952] 2
All E.R. 956.
85. Peer Int’l [2004] 2 W.L.R. 849, at para. 37 (citing Bank Voor Handel En
Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, 257).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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pointed out that “foreign legislation cannot be so designed, and
it will generally be founded on a basis of property law very different from our own.”88 The Court concluded:
[A] principle of private international law that allows property
legislation to operate in the territory of another country, so far
from being a principle which resolves the conflict of laws, will
create a conflict which it will require the formulation of a new
system to settle. There seems … to be every reason … for giving effect to the simple rule that generally property in Eng89
land is subject to English law and to no other.

Informing the Court’s conclusion that the Cuban law was ineffective in the United Kingdom was a general concern that foreign law should not affect ownership interests in property situated within the forum.
B. Justifying Copyright Ownership Rules
One might think that copyright ownership issues in the
transnational context perhaps can be seen to implicate domestic
sovereignty interests to a lesser extent than substantive rules
on infringement. Laws governing ownership do not, for instance, directly determine the availability or price of materials
of culture in different nations. Ownership rules are about who
benefits from the copyright in the work, and have less to do
with the work’s availability to the public. They might, however,
implicate incentives to create copyright works. Nevertheless, as
Peer International illustrates, the link between copyright ownership and domestic sovereignty concerns can tap powerful rhetorical resources and ideological and practical concerns that
may be invoked when foreign legal principles might override
domestic policy choices. That is, even if the potential for “conflict” is likely to arise in a relatively narrow compass, and is
likely to be confined to rules on commissioned works and works
made for hire, it is possible to imagine how the perception of a
foreign law’s usurpation of domestic policy choices about such
matters could trigger more heightened rhetoric. Put another
way, because “sovereignty-respecting” concerns provide a politically-resonant way to understand the legal and political issues
88. Id.
89. Id.
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at stake, the perception that legal actors might ride roughshod
over domestic policy choices will provoke cries of “these are U.K.
copyrights!” or “these are American copyrights!,” and so on.
This is the essence of several current political controversies surrounding the globalization of intellectual property.90
In the Anglo-American tradition, there has perhaps been too
much solicitude for sovereignty interests, particularly in the
subject matter or legislative jurisdiction contexts. For instance,
prior to the English Court of Appeal’s landmark 1999 decision
in Pearce v. Ove Arup,91 English courts refused to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving allegations of foreign copyright infringement.92 In a line of twentieth-century Australian cases,
beginning with an Australian High Court decision from 1903,93
Commonwealth courts analogized intellectual property rights to
land—a type of property that has long been viewed as intimately connected with the sovereign powers of the nation
state.94 Also, in many Commonwealth jurisdictions, infringement of foreign intellectual property rights foundered on the socalled “double actionability” or “lex fori” rule, which, broadly
summarized, required the defendant’s tort to be actionable according to both the lex fori and the law of the place of commission of a tort.95 Due to the territorial confines of intellectual
property rights, foreign infringement could never be actionable
90. See generally Halbert, supra note 5.
91. Pearce v. Ove Arup P’ship Ltd. [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (Eng. C.A.). The
Ove Arup decision was recently applied in the cross-border context in R Griggs
Group Ltd. v. Evans [2004] All E.R. (D) 155 (Eng.), aff’d on other grounds,
[2005] E.W.C.A. 11 (Eng. C.A.). Sitting as Deputy Judge of the High Court,
Peter Prescott Q.C. held that where an English Court has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant, the Court may require assignment of a copyright
arising under a foreign law.
92. See Tyburn Productions Ltd. v. Conan Doyle, 1990 R.P.C. 185 (Ch. D.);
Def Lepp Music v. Stuart-Brown, 1986 R.P.C. 273 (Ch. D.).
93. Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. (1906) 3 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.); Norbert Steinhardt & Son Ltd. v. Meth (1961) 105 C.L.R. 440 (Austl.).
94. The traditional common law rule was that a domestic court had no
jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign land in which rights over the land
required determination. See British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Moçambique [1893] 1 App. Cas. 602 (Eng. P.C.).
95. Compare Boys v. Chaplin [1971] 1 A.C. 356, 379, 389 (U.K.) (appeal
taken from Eng.), with Red Sea Insurance Co. v. Bouygues S.A. [1995] 1 A.C.
190 (P.C. 1994) (U.K.) (appeal taken from Hong Kong) (adopting greater flexibility in the common law version of the rule).
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according to the lex fori. English copyright law, for instance,
does not make unauthorized exploitation of a copyright work a
legal wrong in foreign territory.96
In the Commonwealth, the requirement that foreign torts be
actionable according to the lex fori has mostly been jettisoned,
replaced by the lex loci as the dominant choice of law rule.97
Dean Anne Marie Slaughter cites this development as indicative of a more sensitive transnationalism that is developing in
the thinking of national courts.98 The rule analogizing intellectual property rights to land, which itself reflects a hypersensitivity to foreign sovereignty interests, gave rise to ironic
results: respect for these “special” property rights created under
the laws of a foreign sovereign risks rendering them unenforceable. Concern for the interests of foreign sovereigns in crafting
intellectual property laws may thwart the very policies that
conflicts rules were meant to respect. It is impossible to precisely determine what influenced the English Court of Appeal’s
departure from the orthodox view in Ove Arup.99 Their Lordships’ analysis of the common law justiciability issue was entirely, and meticulously, doctrinal. Whatever the motivation,
the English court’s determination to jettison their earlier aggregation of sovereignty concerns to conflicts rules is a very
welcome development. The approach to justiciability adopted
by the English Court of Appeals better respects sovereignty interests in foreign intellectual property rights. Additionally, by
facilitating the consolidation of proceedings, it is more efficient.
As an attempt to accommodate some of the broader political
concerns arising in intellectual property law today, I would advocate localizing copyright ownership issues broadly in line
with the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass. I advocate this approach
not so much because the Itar-Tass approach will facilitate more
96. See generally Graeme W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights, 113 LAW Q. REV. 321 (1997).
97. In major Commonwealth jurisdictions, the lex fori rule has largely been
abandoned. For example, the United Kingdom has enacted the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 42 (Eng.). Other jurisdictions have abandoned this rule through case law. See, e.g., Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.); Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v.
Zhang (2002) 210 C.L.R. 491 (Austl.).
98. ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 90 (2004).
99. [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (Eng. C.A.).
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efficient licensing and tracing of title, although this is important, or because it is broadly in line with choice of law principles
for other types of property. Rather, I think the Itar-Tass approach can be adapted in a way that is sensitive to the role of
nation states in determining the real life societal contexts in
which intellectual property is created.
Focusing on this kind of concern might enrich our understanding of territoriality, and encourage us, at least in the intellectual property context, to view territoriality in less formalistic
terms. The approach adopted by the Enzed Holdings court
might appear to be respectful of domestic sovereignty interests.
It would allow the law of country X to govern ownership “in”
country X, country Y’s laws to govern ownership “in” country Y,
and so on. On the other hand, it may have the practical effect of
overriding some of the important social policy choices reflected
in the law of the place where a work was first created. Of
course, intellectual property exploitation is now a global concern. Nevertheless, choice of law rules for copyright ownership
should be crafted to take into account the reality that different
nations’ social policies, such as the education system, employment laws, subsidies for artistic creativity, development of
communication networks, and idiosyncratic exceptions and defenses in the copyright system itself, constitute the material
circumstances in which copyright works are created.100 The material circumstances of production fuel authors’ “creative
sparks.”
Similar concerns seem to be reflected in U.S. rules in the
work-for-hire context, which designates as employer (hence
usually the “owner” of the work) the party who controls the
manner and means of production.101 Domestic social policies
are, at least partly, responsible for the material circumstances—the “manner and means”102—in which authorial crea100. I develop this argument more fully in Graeme W. Austin, Valuing
“Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (2002).
101. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
(invoking common law agency principles to determine when a creator is a
worker for hire).
102. Id. (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”).
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tivity occurs. Furthermore, because many issues are likely to
arise in the employment context, we can expect local or regional
rules to reflect domestic traditions, or hard-won compromises,
about the appropriate balance of power between employees and
employers when confronting the issue of ownership of the fruits
of creativity. Accordingly, I would advocate adapting the ItarTass rule, while retaining the general premise that a single
governing law should apply to cross-border ownership issues.
In many instances, we would likely see no difference in the application of the “closest relationship to the property and the
parties” rule. Nevertheless, by focusing on the place with the
closest relationship with the production of the work, we would
be crafting solutions to international conflict of laws problems
that evince broad concern for the connection between domestic
sovereignty and intellectual property regimes. A more nuanced
approach to territoriality, one that is informed by a robust sense
of intellectual property politics, might take these kinds of concerns into account when crafting specific rules.103
In earlier writings, I have argued that application of the lex
protectionis to infringement questions is justified, in part, because intellectual property rights bear the lineaments of societal choices and struggles over access to the materials of culture.104 I again suggest, therefore, that the incidents of property
rights should be determined by the law of the nation whose
members bear the costs of enforcement.105 Yet, place of exploitation does not so obviously have a claim to determine legal issues
relating to the initial creation of the work. Conversely, sensitivity to the material circumstances of production in the crafting of
103. Where several authors are involved, as may be the case with some
outsourcing arrangements, and the issue cannot be determined by reference to
applicable contractual terms, it may be necessary to develop subsidiary rules.
One possibility would be to focus on the contribution of the “dominant” author.
This principle is well-known in U.S. joint authorship doctrine. See, e.g.,
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting the importance of
the intentions of the “dominant” author when ascertaining whether a work is
a work of joint authorship). Perhaps where separately identifiable copyright
protected contributions to a joint work cannot be identified, and the issue is
not governed by contract, an appropriate rule might be to adopt the law of the
place where the dominant author did most of the creative work.
104. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law
for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575 (2000).
105. Id. at 614.
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conflict of law rules seems to better accommodate the political
concerns that are grounded in the connection between domestic
politics and intellectual property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Academics are of course motivated to find the “right” answer
to doctrinal controversies. Yet, academic deliberations are seldom, if ever, dispositive. Usually, our interventions are more
modest: we make contributions to ongoing debates. In some
respects, the ALI Project is similar. Because the ALI Project is
not posing as a “treaty,” and has no pretensions of being “the”
answer to conflict of laws controversies, or of being imposed on
the global legal system, the project’s outcomes will more likely
be a contribution to emerging conversations about how best to
craft private law principles for transborder disputes involving
intellectual property rights. It will be but one (albeit important) contribution to the rich dialogue that is occurring among
jurists in different nations about international law problems.106
Instead of always attempting to “run to ground” the arguments that can be made in favor of, or against, any particular
resolution of a private international law controversy, it might
be productive to consider doctrinal proposals in light of broader
intellectual property politics. At least some of the ALI Project’s
audience, including its most vigorous interlocutors, are likely to
be deeply involved in the political debates that now inform both
domestic and international intellectual property lawmaking.
When we turn our minds to international conflict of laws controversies, it may thus be important to engage with doctrinal
issues in ways that anticipate and respond to critiques that are
likely to be informed and shaped by these broader political concerns. Crafting appropriate choice of law rules for copyright
ownership forms a small part of the monumental task of developing much-needed private international law of intellectual
property. Even so, attempting to justify a choice of law rule for
copyright ownership with reference to the material circumstances of production of works of authorship might be suggestive of ways of engaging with broader political concerns that

106. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 98.
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will inevitably arise as other parts of the ALI Project come to be
scrutinized.

